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Coal Law From the Old World: A
Perspective on Land Use and
Environmental Regulation in the Coal
Industries of the United States, Great
Britain, and West Germany
By Zygmunt J. B. Plater*
I. Introduction
America's reentry into the Coal Age has been one of the
major consequences of the Mideast oil-producing nations' dis
covery of their collective marketing power, and in this new
emphasis on coal the United States is not alone. Like the
United States, many industrialized nations with domestic coal
reserves had allowed their coal industries to languish under the
influence of a low-priced, petroleum-based energy economy
and are now hastening to strengthen their coal production.1
Different nations approach the regulation of their resurgent
coal industries in varying ways, however, and these differences
can be instructive to American observers, particularly as they
relate to land use and environmental control.
Traditionally, coal mining is a dirty business, disrupting
both natural and human ecology. It adversely affects air and
* Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. A.B. Prince
ton, 1965; J.D. Yale, 1968; LL.M. Michigan, 1974. This article wasprepared while the
author was a member of the University of Tennessee College of Law faculty as a
product of the University of Tennessee Environmental Center's interdisciplinary re
search project on international comparisons inthecoal extraction industry, generously
supported by the International Division ofthe Ford Foundation. Allopinions and any
errors herein are the author's own.
1See President's Message, Energy Independence Authority Act of 1975, 11
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1151 (1975). In Britain and West
Germany, deep mines hadbeen closing in the decade prior to the oilboycotts, unable
to compete with imported fossil fuels. Since the boycotts, coal has assumed a major
role in the energy planning for each of the national administrations. The British gov
ernment has planned to invest 600 million over the next few years to increase mining
production to 150 million tons per year. In Britain's comprehensive national energy
policy, coal has an assured future despite the ongoing development of offshore oil
reserves. Routledge, Warning on Coal Costs Threat From Militant, The Times (Lon
don), June 9, 1975, at 18, col. 3. See also R.L. Gordon, The Evolution Of Energy
Policy In Western Europe (1970).
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water quality, disturbs the terrain, and disrupts existing land
use patterns. In the United States, the control of the environ
mental consequences of coal production is being approached in
ambivalent fashion. On one hand, since coal is now recognized
as a major energy source for the foreseeable future, the govern
ment has been forced to give more serious consideration to
basic mining regulation than it did when the industry was a
stagnating anachronism. The recent federal surface mining
bills testify to this trend.2 On the other hand, the energy crisis
has been used to justify weakening the standards of environ
mental control.3 Consequently, the growing body of regulations
for American coal mining varies widely from state to state in
sophistication and rigor, involving in every case a basic conflict
between short-term production goals and long-term standards
of environmental quality.4
Europe has long been concerned with the external social
costs of coal mining.5 When faced with the call for increased
production, however, it does not find itself in America's regula
tory dilemma. The technology, administrative law, and eco
nomics of environmental quality control have been better inte
grated into the production process and can respond without
appreciable strain to increased demand. Great Britain and
West Germany, for example, have recently increased their coal
production with new underground and surface mines, yet these
2 H.R. 9725, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 25, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S.
425, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 60, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971).
3 See, e.g., Veto message from the President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No.
160, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
4 This is not to say that land and environmental controls are novel, since surface
mining laws have been around since at least 1939. W.Va. Acts ch. 8, § 1 [1939] (now
W.Va. Code. §§ 20-6-1 to 30 (1973)). However, because of market competition between
states and the political importance of the coal industry, economic pressures until
recently have dominated environmental concerns.
5 External costs are costs engendered by a productive process but not accountable
to that process in a normal market economy; such costs are passed on to the external
environment. See generally B. Ackerman, Economic Foundations of Property Law,
(1975); Brooks, Surface Mine Reclamation and Economic Analysis, 6 Nat. Resources
J. 13 (1966); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960); F.
Schmidt-Bleek and J. Moore, Benefit-Cost Approach to Decision-making: The Di
lemma With Coal Production; (Appalachian Resources Project Report No. 23) (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Schmidt-Bleek and Moore]. See also Randall and Pagoulatos,
Surface Mining and Environmental Quality: An Economic Perspective, 64 Ky. L.J. (in
this symposium) (1976).
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new mines appear even more fastidious in their planning and
environmental controls than mines opened prior to the energy
crisis. With few exceptions, moreover, the British and German
mines appear to be a quantum leap ahead of their American
counterparts in controlling pollution and subsidence damage,
and in the restoration of mined lands.6
To some extent, ofcourse, it is unfair to compare American
mining practices with European models. Due to geological dif
ferences between the coal regions ofAmerica and Europe, the
application of European coal mining technology to most of the
United States is limited. In addition, market conditions are not
directly comparable, and the value of land is perceived very
differently in the United States and Europe.7 The legal frame
work of mining regulation in those countries, however, is rele
vant in spite of these distinctions. The standards and proce
dures by which new mines areplanned and managed inEurope
have instructive and practical application to the regulatory
system now evolving in the United States.8
This article, as a preliminary report of a short-term, on-
site studyofcoal mining in the United States, the UnitedKing
dom, and West Germany, is not a comprehensive, comparative
analysis of legal institutions in the three countries. Material for
the article was gathered by personal observation ofthe mining
operations in the countries surveyed, informal interviews with
administrators, and a review of relevant statutes and regula
tions.9 This mix of reportorial and analytical material will
serve, it is hoped, as a useful exposition of the administrative
structures that regulate coal mining in Great Britain and West
Germany, for Europe's coal mining achievements clearly de
serve the further attention of private and public participants
in the American coal mining industry.
6 See notes 16-28 infra and accompanying text.
7 See notes 121-123 infra and accompanying text.
8 This article focuses almost exclusively on the environmental and land use con
trols involved in opening new mines rather than mining law enforcement practices.
Thiscomparison is more relevant in lightofcurrent American expansion ofmining and
less restricted by national idiosyncracies in subsequent enforcement practice.
9 This article draws on material collected by and on file at the University of
Tennessee Environmental Center [hereinafter UTEC].
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II. Environmental Effects From Coal Mining in America
and Europe
The adverse effects of coal mining are generically similar
throughout the world. Preservation of water quality is one of
the primary problems, as coal particles and acid from the sul
phur and pyrites associated with coal deposits are pumped,
washed, or leached away from mining sites into neighboring
watercourses.10 Coal mines, in fact, constitute the primary pol
lution source in Appalachian watersheds subject to mining.11
Although deep mining disrupts land features with its surface
operations, transport facilities, and subsidence effects, surface
effects are especially severe and widespread in the strip mining
of coal. In the 40 years before 1971, more than 1 Vfe million acres
in the United States were disturbed by coal mining, 80 percent
of which was caused by surface mines.12 More than one-third
of this total received no reclamation even according to the min
imal standards then applicable.13 Today's reclamation stan
dards, especially in the contour mining of Appalachian moun
tains, still permit extensive land disturbance and the existence
of long-term effects after mining.14 Other common destructive
effects of mining include increased flooding, damage to roads
from coal haulage traffic, agricultural losses, air pollution, and
human dislocation.15
Although extraction problems are similar, Great Britain
and West Germany have demanded and achieved a higher
standard of reclamation for coal mined areas than the United
10 Water quality is especially a problem in the Western United States coalregion.
The large amount of water requiredand changedin quality by coaloperationsis doubly
significant because of its regional scarcity.
11 See Environmental Protection Agency, Processes, Procedures and Methods
to Control Pollution from Mining Activities (1973); Appalachian Regional Commis
sion, Acid Mine Drainage in Appalachia (1969).
12 United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines Informational
Circular/1974-8642, Land Utilization and Reclamation in the Mining Industry, 1930-
1971 at 13, 16, and 55. In addition, the total acreage strip mined and the proportionate
amount of coal extracted by surface mining are increasing each year. Environmental
Protection Agency, Environmental Protection in Surface Mining of Coal 15 (1974).
13 Id. at 16.
14 See notes 96-97 infra and accompanying text. Western coal lands offer severely
restricted reclamation possibilities due to the region's lack of rainfall.
15 For an attempted quantification of some of these costs see Schmidt-Bleek and
Moore, supra note 5.
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States. In West Germany, stripmining takes place in the heart
ofthe Rhineland's best farmland. Rotary bucket-wheel excava
tors weighing 7000 tons and capable of scopping 200,000 cubic
meters of earth a day cut pits several miles wide and 300meters
deep, destroying forests, fields, highways, and villages to pro
duce brown coal, lignite, for the nation's electric utilities. One
company alone mines 100 million tons from approximately
1000 acres ofland a year.16 Yet the West German strip mining
companies have received international recognition for their
mining performance, and in the major coal producing state,
North Rhine-Westphalia, virtually total reclamation is
achieved.17 Pits are backfilled as they are mined, with segre
gated topsoil as a final layer. Forests and fields are recreated,
and towns are transferred and resettled.18 During the mining,
roads, utilities, and rivers are rerouted while groundwater from
within the mining area is segregated by high volume pumps.
Underground ordeep mining in West Germany hassimilar
comprehensive environmental protections. Subsidence dam
ages are carefully predicted, monitored, and mitigated, with
statutory provisions for compensation of private property
losses.19 Water pollution from mining is controlled by on-site
pollution measures supplemented by treatment plants that
process entire rivers to tertiary treatment standards.20 Spoil
banks are shaped, forested, and maintained by the mining
16 Rheinische Braunkohlenwerke A. G. (Information Center); Blickpunkt Braun-
kohle [Focus on Lignite] 6-7 (1973).
17 Blickpunkt Braunkohle [Focus on Lignite] 16 (1973). See also Prize for a
Stripper, Newsweek Dec. 1, 1975, at 86.
18 E. A. Nephew, Surface Mining and Land Reclamation in Germany 15 et seq.
(1972). Inother German states reclamation is often excellent, but regulations in some
areas, including mines adjacent to the East German border, appeared to be less well
enforced than in the Rhineland.
19 Compensation is required for all short and long-term subsidence damages.
Allegemeines Berggesetz 24 June 1865, as amended [hereinafter cited as A.B.G.] §§
148-152. This statute has served as the model for mining laws in most other German
states. In fact, the Essen State Planning Office stilluses a 19th century edition of the
statute with modern inserts as its working officecopy.
20 See note 35 infra. The Emscher river treatment system northof the Ruhr area
was the original model for otherriver associations. Its plantlocated near the confluence
of the Emscher and the Rhine catches sufficient amounts of coal sludge to run a
briquette factory which fuels a local power plant. E. Knop and H. W. Koenig, The
Solution of DifficultWater Engineering Problems by Water Associations (1970);
Emschergenossenshaft Abwasserdezernat: Emscher River Treatment Plant in Bottrop
3 (1970), on file at UTEC.
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companies' large professional forestry staffs, and some are suf
ficiently reclaimed to serve as game management areas.21 Ger
man environmental controls, moreover, are accomplished with
out direct government subsidy as part of the mining compa
nies' cost of doing business.22
British coal mining practices demonstrate a similar regard
for environmental quality. British opencast surface mines,
smaller than their German counterparts, are planned to avoid
disruption ofvaluable surface features, with minimum disturb
ance to roads, watercourses, and human .settlements.23 Among
the safeguards required during the operation ofa typical open
cast mine are separation and storage of topsoil and subsoil,
noise and dust controls, fencing and other access restrictions to
keep livestock out of the pits, transplanation of valuable ma
ture trees, water treatment, diversion of water flows, wheel
washing for coal trucks leaving the site, baffle embankments
for aesthetic controls, and relocation of public footpaths.24 Re
clamation not only involves land restoration to extremely high
agricultural quality but may also include recontouring the sur
face to create local parks, lakes, and forests, and the removal
of slag and deep mine spoil heaps dating from the 19th cen
tury.25
British deep mining also is improving on its earlier per
formance. Though problemsofspoildisposal and subsidence at
some old sites remain unresolved,26 new deep mines are de
signed with an attention to environmental considerations that
21 See SlEDLUNGENSVERBAND RUHRKOHLENBEZIRK, GrCNE HALDEN Im RUHRGEBIET
[Green Colliery Spoil Banks in the Ruhr] 201-223 (1974).
22 The economic component of the University of Tennessee Environmental Cen
ter's coal research project analyzing the complex financing of the German coal industry
indicates that indirect subsidies in the form of wage and price supports are woven into
the industry's budget. No direct subsidy is provided for reclamation and similar envi
ronmental measures. An attempt to gauge the relative importance of indirect supports
will be made in the project's final report.
23 A typical British opencast mine site produces 2 million tons of coal. Opencast
Coal Act of 1958— The Anglers Application — Statement of National Coal Board, 19,
on file at UTEC.
24 Opencast Coal Act of 1958—Albert Site Authorization Schedule 2 (August
9, 1974), on file at UTEC.
25 See notes 82 and 85 infra and accompanying text.
26 Old mines in the Midlands continually cause road damage and other subsidence
effects. At Durham (Seaham) some old mines still dump their spoils into the sea for
lack of adequate disposal facilities.
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far exceeds American practice. Surface buildings and winding
towers are designed for minimum visual obstruction, road and
rail haulage hours are regulated, and elaborate water treatment
and dust control systems are maintained. In addition, housing
and community facilities for miners are part of project plan
ning, and subsidence damages are minimized and repaired or
compensated.27
A comparison of European coal industry practices with
existing American conditions indicates that European mining
pays far more attention to the detrimental effects of coal ex
traction and to their minimization. The subjective indication
of this comparison is that European mines appear to be far
more integrated with their locales than those in America.
Usually this means that the countryside does not seem domi
nated by the presence of mining operations, but rather can
often maintain its rural agricultural nature, while mining con
tinues in a surprisingly unobtrusive fashion. In functional
terms new mines are planned to fit with as little disruption as
possible into the human settlements, transportation patterns,
agriculture, recreation, and industry around them.
European mining also seems to be integrated in political
terms. Although opponents ofmining doexist, mining interests
appear to be regarded as responsible participants in a common
national enterprise rather than as exploitative intruders.28
When mining is completed, the restored mined areas are inte
grated into the long-term productive needs of the area. These
European accomplishments can be attributed in part to ad
ministrative procedures, which make the British and German
regulatory systems worthy of further examination.
27 See discussion ofSelby coal field mining application at notes 65-79 infra and
accompanying text. The BritishNational Coal Board has agreed that subsidence dam
age in that mine will be limited to a drop ofnine-tenths ofa meter despite the fact
that the seam is 11 feet thick, through careful excavation and engineering. Notes on
Selby Inquiry, April 17-18, 1975, on file at UTEC. Subsidence damages are to be
compensated. Coal Mining (Subsidence) Act 1957, 5&6Eliz. 2, c. 59; and The Mines,
(Working Facilities and Support) Act 1966, c. 4.
28 The objectors toBritish coal applications, for example, often phrase their ques
tions in terms of national energy needs and propose mitigation rather than adopting
polarized positions ofopposition. Notes onSelby coal field inquiry, April 17-18 1975
on file at UTEC.
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III. The Regulatory System in West Germany
As one would expect, the German coal mining administra
tion that has achieved the remarkable results noted has a
highly articulated and rationalized structure with multiple lay
ers of investigation and cross-referencing between government
agencies and private parties.
The major participants in the coal mining ofNorth Rhine-
Westphalia, as in other German mining states,29 include large
private mining corporations and a variety of government offi
cials. The most notable private companies are Rheinische
Braunkohlenwerke A.G. (Rheinbraun) which monopolizes
brown coal production in the state, and Ruhrkohle A.G., the
largest ofGermany's deep mine companies.30 Mineral rights are
entirely owned by the government, and the private corpora
tions mine as lessees, a situation similar to that in the western
coal fields of the United States.31 Under the terms of the Ger
man statutes, persons leasingmineral rights acquire easements
over the surface land. The easements are subject either to pay
ment of damages to the owner or a duty to purchase the land
at the owner's request.32
The operation of mineral leases in West Germany is sub
ject to the ongoing review of government agencies, primarily
the State Mining Office, which has 11 autonomous district
offices (Bergdmter) and a central office (Oberbergamt) in Dort
mund. In addition, the State Ministries of Economics and Ag
riculture,33 the district governors' offices,34 state and local water
29 West Germany, the German Federal Republic, is a federation of ten highly
autonomous states plus West Berlin. Because the states rigorouslydefend their auton
omy, federal involvement in coal mining is indirect and negligible. This article focuses
on North Rhine-Westphalia, which holds large deposits of both deep mined bituminous
coal and surface mined brown coal, lignite, although other states were studied. The
major regulatory difference between North Rhine-Westphalia and other states is the
existence of the Brown Coal Committee. See notes 38-44 infra and accompanying text.
30 Rheinbraun is a combination of four postwar lignite companies and is now a
subsidiary of Rheinische Westfalische Elektrizitatswerke A.G., Germany's largest
electrical generating company. Ruhrkohle paradoxically was created in 1968 as a "fu
neral company," which consolidated 30 companies of varying degrees of economic
health in order to close out marginal operations in an orderly fashion. Steel companies
own most of Ruhrkohle's stock; cartels appear to be an accepted form of economic
organization in Germany. See P. Mathias, First Industrial Nation at 90, 389 (1969).
31 Infra note 103.
32 A.B.G. §§ 135-147.
33 The State Mining Office reports to the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry
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authorities,35 and the multilevel land planning agencies,36 all
have duties associated with mining. In the brown coal area, the
state's land planning agencies aresupplemented by the Brown
Coal Committee, which has special powers in the permit issu
ance process. Other agencies which also have official duties
touching on mining include stateforestry, health, power, high
way, railway, nature protection authorities, and several federal
agencies in observer roles.37 The breadth ofagency involvement
is indicative of the complexity and comprehensiveness of the
regulatory process.
Mining proposals undergo administrative processing at
two different stages: First, in the initial permission process to
open an area to mining under the planning statutes, and sec
ond, in subsequent annual permit procedures to authorize each
year's operating plans incompliance with thebasic mining law.
In both cases the German approach is notably comprehensive.
A. Planning Permission — the Brown Coal Committee
Unlike the United States, West Germany is subject to
binding land use plans. New areas being opened to mining
require initial authorization by state land planning authorities
of Agriculture has extensive duties in reclamation.
34 The district governors have duties and authority in the areas ofplanning, for
estry, conservation, and water pollution.
35 Public river associations have thechief responsibility for ensuring water quality,
reporting to the state Ministry ofFood, Agriculture, and Forestry, the associations are
mandatory cooperatives ofall industries ineach watershed. They levy charges on each
polluter based upon the effluent load ofeach and are responsible for water purification
systems. The river associations originated with the Prussian Emschergenossenschaft
Act of 1904. See Knop and Koenig Water Supply Associations in the Rhine-Ruhr
Industrial Region, in SVR Ruhrgebiet Plane, Programme, Projekte29 (1973).
38 North Rhine-Westphalia hasbeen subject to binding landuse plans since 1950.
For a general view ofGerman planning see Kimminich, Town and Country Planning
Laws in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Planning Law in Western Europe, (J.
F. Gardnered. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Kimminich]. The autonomous states in the
Federal Republic ofGermany are independent in regard to their land use planning.
The particular state land planning agency, such as in North Rhine-Westphalia, is
supplemented by a regional land planning agency, in this case by the Ruhr Land
Planning Agency which is inferior to the State agency yet overlaps into other states.
In addition, there are local land planning agencies which are concerned with matters
of local importance.
37 The federal Ministry of Agriculture, for example, has a seat on the Brown Coal
Committee. See E.A. Nephew, Surface Mining and LandReclamation in Germany 84
(1972).
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prior to technical review and granting of permits by the mining
authorities.38 The two reviews have much in common, however,
and in the case of surface mining the Brown Coal Committee
provides a link between them.39 Formed by Brown Coal Re
gional Planning Law of 1950,40 the Committee is comprised of
27 members, representing a variety of interests, who review
mining proposals and advise the state planning agency on re
quired amendments to the general land use plan.
Although theoretically an advisory committee intended to
make recommendations to the state planning agency, the Com
mittee's composition and activity have made it a practical and
politically potent part of the review process.41 The diversity of
its membership insures broad critical analysis of major propos
als such as the Hambach mine near Cologne which is currently
under consideration.42 Before planning approval is given, the
Committee must be assured that a mine's energy potential
justifies the attendant dislocations, and that satisfactory plans
will be made for ongoing environmental control, relocation, and
reclamation.
In the course of deliberations, Committee members often
make technical objections on matters such as topsoil preserva-
•w See Kimminich, supra note 36.
39 Planning permission reviews are dominated by surface mining applications
since deep mining sites have long since been designated as such on land use plans.
Large scale surface mining is a recent phenomenon affecting surface uses far more
extensively than deep mining. No deep mine planning permission cases were encoun
tered in the University of Tennessee Environmental Center's research project. In addi
tion, most surface mining sites needed for the foreseeable future now appear to have
received planning permission.
40 Gesetz uber die Gesamtplanung im Rheinische Braunkohlengebiet, April 4,
1950 [Rhineland Coal Region Planning Act].
41 The members of the Brown Coal Committee include: (1) Officials from the State
Mining District Offices; (2) five officials from county governments; (3) the Director of
the State Mining Office; (4) the State Land Planning Commissioner; (5) an official
from the Federal Agricultural Department; (6) the State Land Settlement Director;
(7) four representatives of local agricultural interests; (8) three mining unionists; and
(9) three officials from the brown coal industry. In addition there are single representa
tives from the power, crafts and trades, and stoneware industries; a general industrial
union; and a local conservation club. It has been suggested recently that water authori
ties be added to the Committee. E.A. Nephew, Surface Mining and Land Reclamation
in Germany 45 et seq. (1972).
42 The mine will be a 3 square-mile pit that will necessitate the removal of villages,
roads, rivers, and all surface features of the existing settled countryside. Company
officials presented the project in complete detail covering the 20 year life of operations
to the Brown Coal Committee and requested planning approval.
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tion and groundwater patterns and suggest amendments or
conditions to the mining proposals. Representing a far broader
scope of interests than the mining industry, the Committee is
more able to make recommendations to the state planning
agency that accomodate the future mining operation to the
state planning scheme. The presence ofthe state mining office
on the Committee, moreover, insures that mining considera
tions are not relegated to later review, adding that office's ex
pertise to the project at an early stage and giving the office a
head start on the subsequent mining permit process. The di
verse membership of the Committee may also result in broad
ening investigations beyond the scope of review required by
statute. During the Hambach mine review, for example, the
queries of one representative of a local government convinced
Rheinbraun to prepare a voluntary environmental impact
statement, a procedure that added 12 volumes of data to the
Committee's deliberations.43 TheCommittee process isundeni
ably demanding in terms of time and resources. When planning
approval finally issues, however,44 virtually every public con
sideration has been raised and provided for prior tothe opening
ofa region to mining. The resulting predictability ofconditions
and requirements is valuable to the private entrepreneurs'
planning and cost estimations as well as to public agencies.
B. Mining Office Permit Procedures
The second stage of review is the annual mining office
permit procedure required for both surface and deep mines. It
is similar to the planning permit review though more specific.
Although this stage is less concerned with the long-term issues
covered in general planning authorizations,45 an even greater
43 Interview with Rheinbraun officials at Schloss Paffendorf, West Germany, June
10, 1975. The environmental impact statement cost approximately $50,000.
44 Decisions aregenerally byconsensus, andwhile thissystem could beinterpreted
by outsiders asa sign oftheCommittee's docility, it reflects a very German phenome
non of constructive accommodation between industry and public concerns. In view of
the increasingly rigorous reclamation standards required by the Committee, the con
sensus system hardly appears to be a pushover.
45 Themining offices arecurrently attempting toexpand application requirements
to include long-term mining plans, a move resisted byindustry onthe theory that this
would be legally binding and too restrictive of their future operations. The current
compromise, pending statutory amendment, is for submission oftentative nonbinding
long range plans. Report by Trauger, on file at UTEC.
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variety of public agencies is involved.
The mining permit procedure has its foundation in the
Prussian Mining Law of 1865 as amended over the years.46
Under this statute, the Bergamt, the district mining office, is
the lead agency for the entire mine regulating process, and the
annual mining permit incorporates all official consents neces
sary to mine.47 Having obtained planning permission, the min
ing corporation files an application with the Bergamt to comm
ence operations and to continue year by year. Applications are
far more complex than their American equivalents. They re
quire complete textual and graphic engineering plans for the
year's mining operations including maps of coal seams, surface
and underground workings, waste disposal areas, and drainage
patterns.48 The Bergamt, which is often involved in informal
prior negotiations with the applicant, then calls for formal ne
gotiations49 and on its own responsibility invites the participa
tion of the water authorities, local planning authorities, and
other concerned agencies. At a series of informal meetings
somewhat resembling collective adjudicatory hearings, the
staff of the applicant corporation presents and defends its
plans against the rigorous inquiries of each agency. Amend
ments in plans may be made or conditions attached as neces
sary. Ultimately the parties reach a consensus and a permit is
issued;50 the maps and plans submitted become part of the
permit and are legally binding.
The strength of the Bergamt review lies in its procedure as
well as its personnel. The rigor with which mining plans are
criticized, of course, depends in great part upon the profes-
46 A.B.G. supra note 19.
47 Id. § 67 et seq. In projects crossing district lines, the Central State Mining
Office, Oberbergamt, handles applications; otherwise it acts only as an appellate tri
bunal to district offices.
48 Id. § 67. The Bergamt can require special information or separate applications
to cover special problems posed by particular projects.
49 Id. § 67 et seq. Since a permit not acted upon within 2 weeks is deemed ap
proved by statute, the agency automatically gives preliminary disapproval in order to
have sufficient time to review and process the application.
50 Though consensus is the norm in Germany, agency disagreements arising in the
course of the negotiations can be resolved by referral to higher authority. For instance,
differences between the water authorities and the Bergamt can be referred to the State
Minister for Economics. Failure of agreement between the applicant and the Bergamt
can be appealed to the Oberbergamt. A.B.G. § 68.
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sional motivation of the agency representatives in protecting
their respective areas of authority and activity, and their indi
vidual dedication is especially crucial since meetings areclosed
and no citizen participation is permitted.51 But in itself the
special nature of the Bergamt review, characterized by a vari
ety ofagencies communicating with the state mining office and
each other over a set ofplans, appears to stimulate an impres
sive amount of analysis.52
C. Standards
There is surprising lack of enunciated permit standards in
the German regulatory process. Unlike mining regulations in
the United States that stipulate specific reclamation stan
dards, the German process appears to resolve these issues on
an ad hoc basis. TheBergamt does issue regulations andguide
lines on mining, but these tend to be generally descriptive
rather than quantifiable. An administrative guideline on
reclamation, for instance, maystate: "Final slope gradients are
to be arranged so as to harmonize with the surrounding land
scape; to avoid landslides and erosion they are to be secured
in various ways, especially by suitably located vegetation."53
Such guidelines require the Bergamt and the mining company
to prepare specific individual requirements in the drafting and
approval of an application's mining plans. Highly particular
ized consideration for each mining site is substituted for the
efficiency of prior existing objective standards, a tradeoff that
relies on the integrity and energy of German administrators for
its success.
The rational procedures and impressive accomplishments
of the German regulatory system do not mean that controver
sies and shortcomings do not occur. Specific permit require-
51 Citizens in West Germany arelargely restricted to political activity inattempt
ing to affect administrative decisions since proceedings arelimited to parties directly
interested and the judicial review of administrative actions is limited in scope and
rarely feasible. Cf Kimminich at 167-68, supra note 36.
52 A typical review results in specific in-depth consideration and agreement on
suchdetailsas spoil bankconstruction, composition, land reclamation, on-site and off-
site water quality, and traffic consequences.
53 Ministry of Science and Commerce of West Germany, Guidelines for Recla
mation of Areas no Longer Necessary for Mining June 18, 1974 at 1340 on file at
UTEC.
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ments are occasionally criticized as unduly harsh by the regu
lated industry.54 Despite elaborate procedures, the Brown Coal
Committee or the state mining office may simply fail to raise
questions highly relevant to permit determinations.55 In some
cases they have permitted the implementation of mining per
mits to fall severely short of required standards.56 In summary,
however, observations of the German mining experience indi
cate that the regulatory process raises and implements environ
mental concerns with a breadth of application, attention to
detail, and rigor that strikes an efficient balance with the en
ergy production needs of the state.
IV. The Regulatory System in Great Britain
Like West Germany, Great Britain has a more articulated
and comprehensive regulatory structure for coal mining than
does the United States, reinforcing the conclusion that proce
dures are in part responsible for superior performance in con
trolling the environmental consequences of mining. The heart
of British controls on coal mining57 lies in the process of grant
ing or refusing land development permission under one of two
applicable statutes. Deep mines are subject to the Town and
54 Mining operators east of the Rhine resisted the revegetation standards for spoils
banks required as part of mining permit conditions by the Ruhr Land Planning Agency
[hereinafter SVR], arguing that maintaining one healthy tree per square meter of
surface posed excessive burdens. Public opinion in the media in 1972-73 forced the
operators to acquiesce. Interview with Regional Planning Authority representatives at
Essen, West Germany, April 23, 1975.
55 In one planning application, involving spoil dumping that was permitted to
obliterate a famous forest near Cologne, the Brown Coal Committee failed to investi
gate the applicant's transport cost figures adequately, thus foregoing an economically
feasible alternative site. Report by Trauger, Koenigsdorfer Forest Application, on file
at UTEC.
5fl A recent controversy involved the "Hoher Meissner" hill, a famous Hessian
landmark noted in Grimm's fairy tales and underlain by coal, in which the coal com
pany mined beyond its permit boundaries and refused to reclaim parts of its pit area,
alleging the agency's lack of statutory authority to require environmental control retro
actively. Although the case was finally compromised at the state government level, it
demonstrates the reliance of the German system upon the good faith of all parties
concerned. Report by Trauger, Hoher Meissner, Germany's Largest Strip Mining
Controversy, on file at UTEC.
57 As used herein, the term "British" encompasses England and Scotland but not
Wales, which has separate coal mining legislation under the jurisdiction of the Welsh
Office in Cardiff.
1976] Coal Law from the Old World 487
Country Planning Acts,58 the land planning system applicable
to all forms of development in the United Kingdom. Opencast
surface mines are exempted from the Town and Country Plan
ning Acts but are regulated through very similar procedures
under the Opencast Coal Act of 1958.59 In both cases a single
permit effectively incorporates all the official consents necess-
sary to operate a mine.
The process ofopeninga newmine in the United Kingdom
is also more simple because the state itself, through the Na
tional Coal Board (NCB), is simultaneously the mineral rights
owner and entrepreneur.80 The NCB is a government corpora
tion, established by the Coal Industry Nationalization Act of
1946,61 with extensive rights and duties in national coal produc
tion. These include broad powers of condemnation if necessary
to develop and work coal seams,82 and the obligation to fulfill
production quotas at reasonable cost to help relieve the coun
try's energy deficit.83 This combination of title, power, and
mining operation in one governmental agency clearly makes
r,» Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51; as amended in
1959, 7 &8 Eliz. 2, c. 53; 1962, 10& 11 Eliz.2, c. 38; 1963, c. 17; 1968, c. 72; and 1971,
c. 78.
59 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 69 [hereinafter cited as Opencast Coal Act of 1958]. Surface
mining was exempted from general planning statutes because it was considered a
quickly available energy source whose production was particularly tied to short-term
national security needs.
60 The Coal Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 52, vested all title to British coal as of
July 1, 1942, in the government's Coal Committee. Title was then transferred to the
National Coal Board in the Coal IndustryNationalization Actof 1946, 9 & 10Geo. 6,
c. 59, which took effect onJanuary 1, 1947. Exceptfor smallcoal deposits that produce
under 25,000 tons per year which may be worked by private opencast operators with
the permission of the Secretary of State for Energy, all operations are carried out
directly by the National Coal Board (NCB). In the case ofopencast surface mining,
the NCB uses private contractors to do the excavation and reclamation work.
61 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 59.
B2 The Board has the power to lower the land surface through removal of deep
mined coal as well as to take land as required for surface facilities. The Opencast Coal
Actof 1958 limited condemnation to "compulsory rights" required for mining, which
in effect allowed the NCB to mine land while paying a yearly user fee with the land
returned to the freeholder upon completion of reclamation.6 &7 Eliz. 2, c. 69, § 46(1).
The opencast compulsory rights power ended by statutory terms in 1968 but is to be
restored in legislation currently pending. Coal Industry Nationalization Actof 1946, 9
& 10 Geo. 6, c. 59, § 36(2).
63 With the ongoing development of North Sea oil fields, Britain hopesto become
a net exporterofoil, though coal remainsa major part of the nation's projectedenergy
budget. Supra note 1.
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mining easier.64 In spite of its status as an agency, however, the
NCB has many of the attributes of West German and Ameri
can private mining entrepreneurs. In opening a deep mine for
example, it must, like a private party, petition local govern
ment authorities for planning permission, and the opening of
an opencast mine is subject to intensive quasi-judicial intra-
governmental scrutiny.
A. The Selby Coal Field and the Town and Country Planning
Act of 1947
The recent discovery of Britain's largest single coal field
illustrates the procedures involved in an NCB deep mine open
ing. The Barnsley Seam, a North Yorkshire seam of high grade
bituminous coal, had been mined to its known limits over the
past 50 years but seemed to taper out in a downward angle
south of the town of Selby. In late 1972, however, a routine
survey boring revealed that the seam reappeared to the north
in a deposit fully 11 feet thick, extending over more than 100
square miles, and containing at least a billion tons of coal.65
The Selby coal field mining application was, according to
some sources, the biggest project ever to come before the Bri
tish planning system.66 The Selby mine was also the first major
British deep mine to come before the planning system, thus
testing the efficiency of the British planning process in coal
mine regulation.
Like any development request in Britain, a deep mine ap
plication can theoretically be handled entirely by local plan
ning authorities. After some informal negotiation, the Selby
84 The NCB need not achieve particular profit figures, for example, but can incur
expenditures in the public interest on political grounds. Supervision is not an adver
sary process since review is intragovernmental and NCB production data is public
rather than proprietary data. Local government authorities recognize the National
Coal Board's governmental stature and will accept NCB's informal "assurances" as
to performance in many cases wihtout requesting formal permit "conditions." Inter
view with Selby inquiry participants, at Yorkshire, England, April 20, 1975. See note
79 infra (assurances and conditions).
B5 British Department of Energy, Coal Industry Examination: Final Report 9
(1974). The full extent of the coal is as yet unknown, and it is probable that there will
be future extensions of the mine beyond current limits, requiring further development
approvals.
66 The Manchester Guardian, March 26, 1975 (daily ed.).
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application was filed with the North Yorkshire County Coun
cil's Planning Committee in August 1974.67 The basic applica
tion for mining permission was simple, a formal two page state
ment of the NCB's intentions with a description of the location
and nature of proposed development activity and requesting
specific development permission for the mine entrance struc
tures and satellite shafts. In the Selby case, however, extensive,
detailed documentation of the future operation of the mine was
annexed to the basic application.68 There was substantial ques
tion whether officials in the sleepy, rural Selby district or in the
newly formed county government,69 neither of whom had had
any prior experience with coal mining, could handle the com
plexities of a major coal project. Nevertheless the local authori
ties quickly established working committees to process the
application and set out procedural and substantive require
ments for planning approval that demonstrated their serious
ness of purpose. Areas were noted in which more technical
detail was necessary prior to approval and in which further
substantive evidence would be required.70 The NCB was re
quired to hire architectural and landscaping consultants to
coordinate with and report to the county council and to finance
a major study of all water-related consequences. According to
established planning procedures, the project application was
publicly advertised and official consultations were entered into
fi7 Under British planning law and the Local Government Law of 1972, c. 70,
authority is divided between district councils and county councils, the former making
specific local design plans, the latter handling all structural planning for major land
use concerns including coal mining. For a general introduction to British planning law
see Planning Law in Western Europe (J.F. Garner ed. 1975).
68 The documentation included a layout of coal seams, mine shafts, and tunnels,
anticipated production figures, the design and approximate location of surface work
ings, potential land subsidence, traffic relocation patterns, drainage patterns, and
estimates of housing requirements for the expected 2000 to 4000 miners.
B9 British counties were reorganized to their current boundaries by the Local Gov
ernment Act of 1972, c. 70.
70 The local council requested a full, detailed application, leaving as little as
possible to subsequent review, under General Development Order, Art. 5(1) from the
Department of the Environment. In particular they were disturbed by a lack of archi
tectural plans for proposed structures, uncertain location of spoils banks, if any, loca
tion of satellite shafts, transportation, subsidence, and water consequences. Since the
mining area is only 15-45 feet above sea level, subsidence poses definite flood hazards
to the farm land because of the nearby North Sea.
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with more than 50 public and private agencies.71 To inform
themselves of mining conditions, committee members made
research visits to several working mines.
The planning approval for the Selby Project, however, was
shortly transferred to a different forum. Despite the impressive
preparations by the local authorities, the Secretary of State for
the Environment, in November of 1974, "called in" the project
for a direct decision, thereby directly submitting the project to
the uniquely British administrative procedure of a planning
"inquiry."72 Without a call-in an application is subject to an
inquiry on appeal; with the call-in, the local authorities' initial
decision-making role was circumvented. Their active investiga
tions continued, however, in light of the county council's prom
inent role as a participant and a potential objector in the in
quiry itself.73
The inquiry resembles a broad scale evidentiary hearing
where the applicant presents its proposal before a hearing
inspector74 who eventually makes a recommendation to the
Secretary of State for the Environment. Throughout the in
quiry, the applicant is subjected to rigorous cross-examination
and the presentation of opposing evidence from statutory par
ties, including the local planning authorities, affected lan
downers, and a variety of other interested parties admitted at
71 These agencies included the county water authority, the electrical generating
board, conservation councils, the Ministry of Agriculture, a waterways association, the
Forestry Commission, a landowners association, and neighboring local governments.
Many of these later appeared at the inquiry. North Yorkshire County Council State
ment, on file at UTEC.
72 Ordinarily a planning authority makes its decision on an application, subject
to an appeal to the Secretary of State for the Environment. In matters of national
importance, as here, the Secretary reserves the right under section 35 of the Town and
Country Planning Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51, to take over the question and
proceed directly to an "inquiry." That he did so was a matter of some regret to.the
NCB and local bodies alike, since they felt that a satisfactory local working arrange
ment had been created.
7:1 The primary tactical consequence of the call-in was that it forestalled a
dispositive agreementbetweenthe localcounciland the applicant, sinceonlythe latter
can appeal the local decision. See A. E. Telling, Planning Law and Procedure 134
(4th ed. 1973).
74 Inspectors are typically experienced engineers who specialize in hearing plan
ning appeals. Though formally part of the Department of Environment, they maintain
scrupulous insulation from the Secretary's own staff in order to avoid loss of objectiv
ity.
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the inspector's discretion.75 The Selby inquiry absorbed 37
working days from early April to June of 1975, with extensive
presentations by the applicant National Coal Board and the
local councils, and appearances by 100 witnesses.76 Citizen
comments were also received at the inquiry as well as 250 writ
ten representations.77
Under the pressure of the inquiry, the NCB's plans were
scrutinized from a variety of perspectives, including mining
technology, national energy requirements, and environmental
effects. In the course of the inquiry it became clear that much
of the NCB's detailed planning had not been sufficient. Be
cause of this the hearings became an evolutionary process
which included a broad and detailed review of the project and
reflected the parties' openness to constructive dialogue. The
North Yorkshire County Council, a statutory objector, for in
stance discovered that a high speed rail line was projected for
the mine area, and the NCB was prompted to take special
precautions and negotiate a different route with the British
Rail Corporation. The NCB was also convinced to redesign its
surface lighting facilties to avoid ecological effects on insect life
in a local marsh,78 and several discussion sessions were devoted
to reducing the aesthetic impact of winding towers by lowering
their height by 4 feet.
The inquiry absorbed large amounts of time and money.
The local council alone spent approximately 100,000£ on the
inquiry and the inspector's report and recommendation was
not filed until the Spring of 1976. The Selby project has been
substantially amended under the administrative scrutiny of
the inquiry, and the Secretary's approval incorporates a variety
of conditions and assurances that were defined during those
75 A. E. Telling, Planning Law and Procedure 253 (4th ed. 1973); G. Dobry,
Review Of The Development Control System (Report to the Secretary of State for
the Environment and the Secretary of State for Wales) 109-121 (1975).
76 In addition, the intervening parties included the Yorkshire Water Authority, the
National Farmers Union, the County Landowners Association, the British Waterways
Association, the National Union of Miners, the Council for the Preservation of Rural
England, gas and electricity boards, and several neighboring local governments. North
Yorkshire County Council Statement, on file at UTEC.
77 Id.
78 A rare bird species, it turned out, was dependent on the marsh's mayflies, which
would be diverted from their native habitat by the nighttime illumination at the mine
mouth.
492 Kentucky Law Journal [Vol. 64
sessions.79 The virtue of the process is that nearly every impor
tant potential problem is raised prior to commencement of a
project, through active participation and analysis by various
public and private interests.
B. Opencast Coal Act Procedures
Opencast mining is proportionately a much smaller part of
Britain's coal industry than deep mining, but its controversial
nature has meant that all opencast sites may be subjected to
an inquiry. Even though planning approval under the Open
cast Coal Act of 1958 lies entirely within the Department of
Energy, local planning councils, affected owners, and in some
cases private citizens can object to a proposal and demand a
full inquiry.80
In several sites reviewed during the course of the study, it
was evident that the ever present prospect of an inquiry for
each application compelled the NCB to make extensive prior
efforts to avoid local objections. Prior to formal application,
NCB liaison staff members establish working relations with
affected landowners, neighbors, and local government authori
ties.81 Although assurances concerning the replacement of top-
soil, the restoration of contours, the re-creation of water
courses, and the preservation of surface features of special in-
79 The Selby project has been approved and production will begin in 1980 reaching
full production in the latter 1980's. Decision of Sec. of State, Dep't of Environment,
M/5069/42/l, March 31, 1976; Coal Week No. 15, April 12, 1976, at 3. Conditions
become part ofthe planning authorization and are legally bindingwhile assurances are
informal agreements and areonly enforceable politically, though theyapparently have
substantial practical effect. Interview with official of the North Yorkshire Water Au
thority at Selby, England, April 19, 1975.
80 Unitil passage of the Coal IndustryActof 1975, c. 56, any member ofthe public
could object to an opencast operation if it would affect a public footpath. Opencast
Coal Act of 1958, § 18. Now the right to object is reserved to local authorities "and
owners, lessees, and occupiers of the land. Coal Industry Act of 1975, c. 56, Schedule
4.
The primeconcern ofobjectors typically is surface disruption ofminedlands, and
the requirements and conditions of the Minister ofEnergy's approval typically focus
on fastidious control of waterquality, preservation of uniquesurface features, and the
restoration of topsoil and agricultural productivity.
Nl The standard direction to liaison personnelentering a newarea is "find out what
the locals want." "Horsetrading" to win local support is part of the planning process.
Interview with official of the Opencast Executive at Harrow-on-the-Hill, England,
December 14, 1974.
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terest are the most important issues, the NCB's negotiated
efforts often go further than conservation of existing values. As
part of its agreements with local interests, the NCB may under
take major improvements on mined lands in lieu of an inquiry.
This has often involved the creation of agricultural land out of
old deep mine spoil heaps, the reclamation of derelict polluted
ponds and swales, and the construction of local parks. Since
opencast sites are far smaller than deep mines and highly prof
itable,82 the NCB can offer major environmental undertakings
in order to avoid the delays of an inquiry.
If the prior negotiations are successful, the application is
submitted to the Minister for Energy under the terms of the
Opencast Coal Act of 1958 with proposed conditions that
incorporate the local agreements. Proposals unopposed by local
objections are routinely approved without inquiry.83
If local objections continue, an inquiry is held under the
same procedures applicable to deep mining, but on a smaller
scale. At the inquiry, statutory parties and interveners review
the broad environmental and sociological problems that min
ing will create and the Board's plans for avoidance or mitiga
tion of those problems. Although opencast inquiries typically
absorb several days instead of the Selby inquiry's 3 months,
regional energy requirements, the adequacy of transportation
systems, and agricultural needs are also reviewed. The Inspec
tor's recommendations are given great weight, even though the
Secretary has not followed them in every case.84
C. Standards
In Great Britain as in West Germany, the lack of declared
permit and reclamation standards stands in marked contrast
82 A ton of opencast coal costs approximately 6.50 per ton to produce realizing a
profit of 1.51 per ton, as compared with costs of approximately 10 per ton for deep
mined coal. National Coal Board, NCB Annual Report and Accounts, 8-9 (1974).
83 National considerations are incorporated into the Minister's decision-making
through staff consultations with related industry boards, but typically the scope of
opencast proposals minimizes such considerations.
84 In the case of the Lofthouse opencast site, the NCB reduced the scope of its
workings from an original projection of 600,000 to 155,000 tons of coal. Despite the
Inspector's affirmative recommendation, the Secretary decided that the diminished
amount of coal did not justify the amenity damages that mining would cause. Letter
from Department of Trade and Industry to the NCB, June 9, 1972, on file at UTEC.
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to state mining laws in the United States. Permits and condi
tions in both deep and surface mining are shaped by a dialogue
between the applicant and interested parties. The standards,
furthermore, are stated in subjective rather than objective
terms.85 Since the standards for controlling reclamation are
subjective, mutual trust and the sharing of goals between the
various national agencies, the NCB, and local authorities who
enforce the mine regulations is necessary.86The lack of enforce
ment actions against opencast operations since 1958 indicates
that this regulatory approach is working.87 After the energetic
arguments over coal mining proposals which occur in the re
view and inquiry process prior to the issuance of mining per
mission, subsequent operations and enforcement appear to
implement the planning results in pro forma fashion.
V. American Coal Regulation
A definitive analysis of the land use and environmental
law of American coal mining is beyond the scope of this arti
cle.88 A brief review of state and federal coal regulation, how
ever, can provide some relevant comparisons with European
methods.
85 Surface mined land, for example, must be reclaimed so that it will "be reasona
bly fit foruseas agricultural land." Opencast Coal Actof1958, § 2(2). In practicethat
judgmentis madeby the Ministry ofAgriculture 5 yearsafter the close ofoperations.
S6 Under the Town and Country Planning Act of 1971, c. 78, § 87, violators of
permitsor conditions are restrained by issuance of enforcement notices by localplan
ning authorities, which can be prosecuted in court if the violation continues. See A.E.
Telling, Planning Law And Practice 166 et seq. (1975). Deep mine enforcement
follows the same procedure. Interview with Department of the Environment official in
London, England, December 16, 1974.
K7 The NCB'sreclamation accomplishments and the aggressive negotiating stance
of local authorities indicatethat the lackofenforcement actionsis not to be explained
in terms of local laxity. In spite of its predecessor's bad reputation from wartime
opencast operations, the Opencast Executive of the NCB has established a positive
reputation based upon its reclamation efforts and creation of amenities on mine sites.
The result is that some communities with unreclaimed lands now actively encourage
mining. In addition to this, the Government has turned to the Opencast Executive for
advice on restoration ofdisturbed areas generally. Interview withofficial ofOpencast
Executive at Harrow-on-the-Hill, England, April 17, 1975. See Stevens, Report on
Derelicit Lands, to be issued 1976.
** That task will be treated further in the University of Tennessee Environmental
Center's research project final report.
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The regulation of coal mines in the United States is a
highly balkanized system, involving a multiplicity of agencies
functioning at different levels and operating with different
perspectives and standards within states and in different parts
of the nation. Apparently this system has not provided a satis
factory level of environmental quality, since the United States,
unlike Great Britain and West Germany, has recently wit
nessed persistent attempts to improve its system of coal mining
regulation.89
In the regulation of the process of opening new coal mines,
it is initially notable that there is no coordination among Amer
ican coal-producing states.90 To some degree this hinders each
state's ability to regulate the industry effectively.91 Further
more, no coal producing state has an enforceable general land
development planning system that would fit coal mines into a
coordinated statewide plan.92 Instead, each mining application
is presented individually to a variety of state agencies and
authorization proceeds in piecemeal fashion.
Typically, the only direct environmental review that deep
mine applications receive is through water pollution permits.93
In addition the regulation of subsidence and spoil banks is
rare94 and the few available indirect controls are inadequate.95
89 Supra note 2.
90 Though the Interstate Mining Compact includes most established mining states
as signatories, it has no substantive powers and its functions are limited to studies and
recommendations. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. 350.300-.310 (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as KRS]; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 58-1801 to 1803.
91 Competition between Appalachian and Western States with coal deposits for
the economic benefits of the coal industry can result in mutual dilution of environmen
tal standards. The same phenomenon in air and water pollution in the 1960's prompted
the nationwide minimum standards of the Federal Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970,
42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974), and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 to 1376 (Supp. IV, 1974).
92 Strip mines can be included as "Areas of Critical State Concern" in the overall
planning scheme of the A.L.I. Model Land Development Code; see notes to § 7-201
(Proposed Official Text and Commentary, 1975). Wyoming, however, has enacted a
state land use planning law requiring the development of local land use plans. Wyo.
Stat. §§ 9-849 to 9-862 (1975 Cum. Supp.).
93 See, e.g., KRS § 224.034 (Supp. 1974). Kentucky has proposed regulations,
which are now at the Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
in Frankfort, Kentucky, for the regulation of the surface effects of deep mining. Deep
mine operations are presently regulated through health and safety acts such as 30
U.S.C. §§ 801-877 and KRS ch. 351. (1971). (Supp. 1974).
94 Pennsylvania appears to be the only state with an antisubsidence law. The
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State regulation of surface mining is more comprehensive, how
ever. Most states require special strip mining permits, which
are issued by surface mining agencies according to preordained
standards after an agency review of the entire mining proposal.
The state regulation of surface mining is particularly criticized
as inadequate, however,96 and although this may be attributed
in part to inefficient administration of existing regulations or
to industry inattention or evasion, a greater fault would seem
to lie with inadequate statutory review procedures as well as
substantively diluted standards.97
Procedurally, the strip mine permit process in this country
does not attempt a comprehensive review. No statute appears
to require consultation with local government authorities in
areas proposed for mining, and most do not require consulta
tion with other state level agencies.98 Since the granting of the
mining permit is usually not the result of coordinated delibera
tion among agencies and interested parties, the permit grant
ing agency's final decision need not take into account their
different points of view." In these circumstances, the permit
Bituminous MineSubsidence and Land Conservation Act of 1966 requires a review of
mining plans, assurances ofsubjacentsupport fordesignated surface features, and the
issuance of a permit prior to mining. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, §§ 1406.1-.19 (Purdon's
Pamphlet 1975-76). Thisstatute provides an interesting epilogue to Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See also Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, §§ 631, 661 etseq.
(1935) (anthracite mining laws). Pennsylvania also seems unique in its Coal Refuse
Disposal Act of 1968, which regulates spoil banks. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 30.51 et
seq. (Purdon's Pamphlet, 1975-76).
95 Since mines rarely occur in areassubject to zoning or other land development
controls, local authorities are relegated to indirect regulation by means ofroad weight
limits, property tax assessments, and coal severance taxes. These indirect controls are
insufficient to provide a meaningful consideration of mining problems.
96 See Center for Science in the Public Interest, Enforcement of Strip Mining
Laws (CPSI ENERGY SERIES VIII, 1975).
97 Allowing the dumping ofoverburden on slopes duringcontour mining in moun
tainous areas was noted by one visiting representative of the British Department of
Energy as unthinkable in the European context. Interview with Charles Tebay in
Knoxville, Tennessee, February 1975. Reclamation bonds have been justly criticized
as insufficient to insure adequate reclamation. Schmidt-Bleek and Moore at 20-21,
.supra note 5.
9* Some states do provide for limited multi-agency consideration. See, e.g., KRS
§351.175 (Supp. 1974) (certification oftransportation plan bybureau ofvehicle regula
tion); Tenn. Code Ann. § 58-1544(7) (1968) (water qualitypermit required); Va. Code
Ann. §§ 45.1-.205 (1974) (discretionary consultation with other state agencies).
99 The American counterpart to the European practice ofseekinga consensus that
to someextent accomodates opposing viewpoints is limited to situations wherepermits
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application review is a circumscribed process, rarely consider
ing the full range of human and environmental effects to be
anticipated. Problems arising later are handled, if at all,
through subsequent enforcement measures or private tort ac
tions.100
Federal regulations add a further layer of complexity to
the administrative process. The recently vetoed federal strip
mine bills would have added federal requirements to state min
ing regulation101 as do the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972.102 By far the most interesting federal en
vironmental regulation of coal mining, however, appears in the
rules applicable to federal coal lands, which comprise 85 per
cent of the nation's low sulphur coal reserves and are located
primarily in the western states.103 These coal fields resemble
their European counterparts geologically and legally since the
mineral rights are owned by the government and private min
ing companies must acquire the right to mine coal by lease or
patent subject to federal regulatory standards.104 Due to the
are required from other agencies and wherepublic hearings are held. See, e.g., Public
Hearings in Frankfort, Kentucky on October 9, 1975, on proposed regulations on "The
Surface Effects of Underground Mining," conducted pursuant to KRS 350.028(2)
(Supp. 1974).
100 Subsequent enforcement procedures such as collecting the bond due to viola
tions of the regulations are economically wasteful because it is generally cheaper to
prevent environmental disruption than to remedy a violation after it has occurred.
Tort claims are often not a deterrent given to destruction in light of the broad
construction givento mineral rights. See Schneider, StripMining in Kentucky, 59Ky.
L.J. 652 (1971-72).
"" The 1974 Federal Strip Mine Bill would have provided.for the imposition of
federal standards requiring consideration of various environmental effects both on and
off the site, as well as strengthening the standards currently required by most states.
H.R. 25, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 501-515 (1975).
102 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974).
103 Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See ProposedDept.
of Interior Regs. §§ 3041.0-1 to 3041.8, and 211.1 to 211.74, 40 Fed. Reg. 41125-41138
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Federal Mining Regulations].
104 See Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181et seq. (1970); Mineral
Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, 30 U.S.C. § 351 et seq. (1970); Mineral Location Act
of 1872, 30U.S.C. § 22et seq. (1964) (governing lodeand placer patents); The Reorgan
ization Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C.A. Appendix at 188-189 (1967) (competitive leases); and
Proposed Federal Mining Regulations. With the exception of some registration of min
ing claims acts, state lawsdo not apply to federal mining, though this may be changed
by the Proposed Federal Mining Regulations. United States Department of the
Interior, Bureau of Mines Informational Circular/1970-8482, Summary of Mining and
Petroleum Laws of the World at 35-36.
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drastic environmental changes that attend the development of
thinly populated western coal fields,105 federal regulatory con
trols are currently undergoing major expansion.106 On their face
the new regulations appear far broader and more detailed than
prior existing federal and state controls. Preliminary mining
plans and a technical examination and environmental analysis
(TE/EA), for example, must precede the initial grant of a lease
by the Bureau of Land Management107 and a full scale
environmental impact statement is required where major envi
ronmental effect is likely. The leases, licenses, or exploratory
permits to be issued by the Bureau of Land Management are
subject to fairly stringent environmental standards on water
quality, land disturbance, and method of operation.108 Prior to
actual mining operations, a complete, detailed mining plan
must be submitted,109 and the issuance of environmental im
pact statements may be necessary when regional environmen
tal consequences are possible.110
The new rules appear stringent, but incorporate shortcom
ings which may or may not be remedied in practice. First,
permit and leasing decisions do not have to follow the optimum
course of action set out in environmental impact statements,
since environmental impact statements are generally inter
preted judicially as procedural rather than substantive stric
tures upon administrative action.111 Further, the rules allow
105 A federal court has noted that Western coal development will affect regional
water supply and quality, air quality, wildlife, population distribution, and economic
structure, as well as disrupting the surface of now fertile land. The new development
will include mines, powerplants, powergrids, coalgasificationplants, railroads, aque
ducts, pumping plants, reservoirs, dams, and urban development. Sierra Club v. Mor
ton, 514 F.2d 856, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1975), U.S. App. Pndg.
108 See generally Proposed Federal Mining Regulations.
107 Proposed Federal Mining Regulations, §§ 3041.1-1 to 3041.21 at 41128-29.
108 Id. § 3041.0-7 at 41126-28.
109 Id. § 211.10 at 41132-33.
1.0 § 102(2) of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970),
requires the issuance of a comprehensive environmental impact statement (EIS), for
"major federal actions significantly affecting the qualtiy of the human environment."
However, there is some controversy as to whether the regional EIS's have adequately
weighed the environmentalimpact of the leasing of federal coallands. Speechby Bruce
J. Terris in Washington, D.C. to the American Association of Law Schools, Environ
mental Section, Dec. 29, 1975.
1.1 EIS's are generally interpreted judicially as procedural rather than substantive
restrictions on administrative action. See, e.g., Calvert Cliff's Coord. Comm'n v.
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permits to be issued prior to final mining plans, and the scope
of participation in permit reviews may be restricted. Citizens,
for example, have no right to participate in the process, and
while a number ofagencies may be consulted, different agency
procedures need not be coordinated.112
The effectiveness of the proposed federal regulations in
inserting a proper environmental component into the mining
equation will depend on the attitudes and actions of the enforc
ing officials. The Bureau of Land Management could deny
leases or permits to minefederally owned coal or attach specific
conditions to the granting of leases that wouldresolve potential
problemsraised by either regional environmental impact state
ments or the particular technical examination and environ
mental analysis.113
VI. Differences Between the American and European
Mining Experiences
This analysis has related differences in environmental per
formance to differences in regulatory structure. Other distinc
tions exist, however, that might explain the apparently supe
rior performance of European mining. There are, for instance,
geological differences that limit the use of European mining
technology, although there are areas in the United States in
which the German strip mining methods could be used.114 Some
German and British strip mines with coal seams of comparable
depth and thickness to those in American mines, however, are
reclaimed according to much higher environmental stan-
United States A.E. Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); McQueary v. Laird, 449
F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971). Cf. Environmental LawInstitute, Anderson, TheNational
Environmental Policy Act, in Federal Environmental Law 238 (E. Dolgin and T.
Guilbert eds. 1974).
1,2 Citizensonly have the right to inspect and to comment upon proposed leases
or permits. Proposed Federal Mining Regulations, § 3041.5 at 41129.
":J The enviromental impact statement is not mandatory under the National En
vironmental Policy Act § 102(2), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970). The technical examina
tions and environmental analysis (TE/EA) are required under the Proposed Federal
Mining Regulations, § 3041.2 at 41128-29.
114 Illinois Mining Institute Proceedings, J. Huey, Development and History of
Wheel Excavators ir. the USA, 65-90 (1964).
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dards,115 indicating that geological differences alone are not
controlling. Neither do economic differences control. Although
there is a relative lack of market competition in both Britain
and Germany, and government subsidies are sometimes avail
able to support certain environmental costs,116 American coal
mining is still more profitable than European mining in corpo
rate accounting terms.117 The absorption of greater reclamation
expenses by European mining as a cost of doing business must
be explained in other terms.
Sociological and political differences better explain some
of the variations among the three countries. The British and
German civil services which implement the coal regulations
appear to be less political than their American counterparts.118
In addition the American agencies often seem to regard their
regulatory duties as a balancing of interests rather than as a
literal enforcement of statutes and regulations as they are writ
ten.119 In general, the European administrators appear to be
more fastidious and professional in carrying out their duties;
European regulatory agencies might very well duplicate their
achievements using American mining regulations.120
In addition to the cultural differences between civil serv
ices, the difference in mining regulation and the results of that
regulation may be further explained by the value the different
1,5 German lignite often lies in seams 100 feet thick under 30 feet of topsoil, which
facilitates more economical removal methods through the use of larger machines.
Often, however, in both Germany and England the depth of the coal seam and its
fractured nature offset the cost advantages of seam thickness for both deep and surface
mining. See Report by Trauger, German Surface Mining in Hessen and Brunswick, on
file at UTEC.
116 In Britain government subsidies are available for up to 85 percent of the total
reclamation costs where mining is conducted on previously derelict (unreclaimed)
mining lands. Interview with British Department of Environment official in London,
England, Dec. 16, 1974. Cf. note 22 supra.
1.7 These conclusions are drawn from research by R.A. Bohm which will be part
of the University of Tennessee Environmental Center's research project.
1.8 The German administrators indicated that, as with the British civil servants,
enforcement proceedings were strictly between themselves and the mining corpora
tions and that they did not have to adjust their regulations because of outside political
pressure. Interviews with deep mine reclamation officials at Essen and Bochum, West
Germany, December 21, 1974 and April 23, 1975.
1.9 See Center for Science in the Public Interest, Enforcement of Strip Mining
Laws (CPSI Energy Series VIII, 1975).
120 This conclusion is based on the author's personal observation of the respective
regulatory agencies in action.
1976] .Coal Law from the Old World 501
cultures attach to land. Britain and Germany do not allow
short-term economic interests to dominate their land use poli
cies because land is a valuable and scarce long-term economic
asset to them. In Germany, for example, where strip mine re
clamation is now only narrowly profitable, the mining compa
nies never considered anything less than full reclamation, even
when it operated at a net loss.121 In landrich America, the finite-
ness of land is still unappreciated. Reclamation, it is often
argued, is not an economically efficient or reasonable goal,
sincethe cost of reclaiming an acre ofAppalachian countryside
would exceed its present market value.122 In contrast, the Bri
tish regard present market value as an inadequate reflection of
the intrinsic value of land as a long-term resource.123
VII. Applying European Concepts to American Regulatory
Processes
Notwithstanding cultural distinctions, European coal reg
ulations apparently offer structural advantages over current
American regulatory practices. National land use planning is
one source of the European ability to consider all major
development proposals, through examinations of their physi
cal, social, economic, and environmental effects. As West Ger
man and British mining demonstrates, national planning can
be the basis for the efficient integration of new coal mines into
the nation's energy policy and into present and future uses of
the land. Current land use planning in the United States is
primarily an ad hoc local affair and meaningful state land
planning systems have been adopted in only a few areas.124
121 Interview with Rheinbraun executive at Schloss Paffendorf, nearCologne, West
Germany, June 23, 1975.
122 See Schmidt-Bleek and Moore, supra note 5. Ongoing research at the Univer
sity of Tennessee Environmental Center seems to indicate that these external costs
may well exceed the cost of reclamation. A relevant note: the same acre of coal land
with an average 3 foot seam produces3,000 tons of coal, at $20perton it producesgross
revenues of $60,000.00.
123 Interview with Mr. D.G. Davison, of the NCB Opencast Executive, at Harrow-
on-the-Hill, England, April 16, 1975.
124 The demise of the 1973 federal land use bill has postponed nationwide land use
planning. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See Environmental Policy Division,
CongressionalResearch Service, National Land Use Policy Legislation, AnAnalysis
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Lacking such comprehensive land planning systems, it is
more realistic to propose specialized state coal mine develop
ment statutes for America that incorporate features of the Eu
ropean systems. In essence this would entail a comprehensive
master permit proceeding in which a hearing examiner or com
mittee of examiners would investigate the full range of issues
arising in the opening of a new mine. Mandatory participation
would be required of specified agencies and public bodies with
liberal opportunity for citizen participation. Final binding ap
proval would incorporate standards and conditions particularly
tailored to the requirements of each site, arrived at through
consideration of the full range of interests represented at the
hearing. The theory of such specialized legislation, as opposed
to general development planning, is that coal mining repre
sents a development situation of particularly critical govern
mental concern.125 With such a restricted scope of application,
coal mine application review statutes are unlikely to arouse the
violent opposition faced by general land use bills. The form of
the legislation could be drawn from present statutes that deal
with other specific land development situations.126
One of the most notable features of the European coal
review process is the master permit that embodies all official
consents necessary to mine. This innovation would improve
current American state and federal practices by avoiding exist
ing regulatory complexity and duplication. It is conceded that
a master permit procedure focusing all regulatory interests and
public intervention on a proposal at a single proceeding might
impose heavier burdens on mining applicants than do current
fractionalized procedures. The waste of time and resources due
to multiple administrative procedures could be avoided, how
ever, and with final permit approval the mining companies
would be more certain in their operations since, absent a
change of circumstances, a master permit would fix all legal
requirements during its effective period. The ABA has sug-
of Legislative Proposals and State Laws (1973); ALI Model Land Development Code
(Proposed Official Text and Commentary, 1975); see, e.g., Wyo. Stat. §§ 9-849 to 9-
862 (1975 Cum. Supp.).
125 ALI Model Land Development Code, notes to § 7-201 (Proposed Official Text
and Commentary, 1975).
126 See, e.g., 38 Maine Revised Stat. Ann. §§ 481-488 (Supp. 1975) (subdivision
development regulations that require site planning prior to construction).
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gested the unitary review approach in other contexts, and its
adoption in the United States would not seem to require any
fundamental change in the American administrative system.127
The effectiveness of a single proceeding for issuing a mas
ter permit depends, of course, on the nature of the proceeding
itself. In addition to requiring comprehensive participation, an
element adequately demonstrated in the British and German
systems, the proceeding must be truly balanced in its resolu
tion of issues. The European method emphasizes consensus
decision-making where the planning committee, miningoffice,
or inspector seeks to identify the best solutions objectively
through compromise and negotiation rather than by choosing
the position of one adversary over another. To avoid the prob
lems posed by the latter alternative, a format must be achieved
in which all issuesare raised and no interest dominates; mining
and environmental interests must be equally subject to com
promise. In Britain, it is interesting to note that this approach
is served by the inquiry inspector's disinterested role. Backed
by expert consultants and carefully balancing all relevant fac
tors, the inspectors must submit a comprehensive recommen
dation with proposed standards and conditions and hence can
leave no issue undeveloped. If a hearing examiner in an Ameri
can mine development proceeding had a similarly detailed
mandate, the adversary procedures currently common in ad
ministrative hearings would have to change.
Such an administrative change would also affect the stan
dards governing mining development approval. In Britain and
West Germany, officials faced with comprehensive mining
applications are thereby constrained to incorporate an equally
comprehensive range of standards in their review and permit
decisions. By the same token European mining permit stan
dards are individualized to each specific mine, an improve
ment of the standardized regulatory procedures currently ap
plied in most states. By individualizing permit standards, the
Europeans avoid the American problem of statewide standards
that must be diluted in order to be generally applicable and
127 American Bar Association, Special Committee on Environmental Law, Devel
opment, and the Environment, Legal Reforms to Facilitate Industrial Site Selection,
4-9, 45 et seq. (1974).
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end up as industry norms rather than proscribed maximum
limits.
Public participation in the mining review process is gen
erally discretionary in all three countries. In Germany, local
government representatives seem to provide sufficient
representative participation for local citizens.128 In Britain, al
though citizens are unable to intervene as of right in inquiries,
it has been the practice since 1964 to encourage public partici
pation through a policy which seeks to avoid later controversy
and litigation.129 Given the litigious nature of American envi
ronmentalists, a similar policy to encourage public participa
tion at an early stage of the planning process to forestall later
problems should be at least equally relevant.130
It is true that European comprehensive review procedures
and high reclamation compliance standards generate high
costs. The cost of the Selby coal field inquiry to the objectors
was $200,000, a figure that was undoubtedly equaled by the
128 Interview with official of North Rhine-Westphalia Land Planning Office at
Essen, West Germany, April 22, 1975.
129 See G. Dobry, Review of the Development Control System (Report to the
Secretary of State for the Environment and the Secretary of State for Wales). Affected
landowners are entitled to intervene in the mining review under the Town and County
Planning Act of 1971, c. 78, § 29.
130 The public hearings that are often required by states are held only when new
regulations are formulated and not when mining permit applications are being consid
ered, thus preventing public input on individual permits. See, e.g., KRS 350.028(2)
(Supp. 1974). Some states have provided statutory standing to sue for citizens when
the environment is threatened. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 691.1202 (1968). See Sax and
DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years Experience Under the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act, 4 Ecol. L.Q. 1 (1974). The Alaska pipeline litigation
demonstrated that public intervention can be a part of a constructive review process.
Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert, denied,
411 U.S. 917 (1973).
Questions of permit duration, enforcement, and judicial review are less instructive
in comparative terms. In the former case, German practice is to require annual mining
permits, while British authorizations are open-ended, limited only by their terms.
There is some indication that the limited one-year term of German permits is disad
vantageous in planning terms, but annual review does facilitate careful tailoring of
mining plans and enforcement. The duration of permits is probably best determined
by each jurisdiction in light of its review and enforcement capabilities. Enforcement
likewise is likely dependent upon each nation's civil service and corporate respect for
law, commodities which are generally not considered exportable. In the same way, the
scope and standard of judicial review of administrative decisions are highly particular
ized to each country. Presumably the record and findings of adjudicatory hearings in
the United States would be reviewable under the traditional standards of the Adminis
trative Procedure Act and its state equivalents.
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National Coal Board permit applicants.131 Although it is diffi
cult to ascertain the administrative costs ofan average British
inquiry, it takes more than 60 weeks to process on appeal, and
Britain's total yearly planning costs approach $80 million.132
Environmental control costs appear to be correspondingly
high, since approximately 5 percent of the total revenue from
German surface mines isspent on reclamation133 and 25 percent
or more of a British opencast mine's total operating budget
may reflect reclamation and other environmental expendi
tures.134 Despite these large costs, it appears that the present
and projected demand for coal is sufficiently strong to allow
surface mine reclamation expenses to be absorbed into the cost
of extracting coal.135 In Europe, total reclamation is a norma
tive decision notdirectly responsive to economic pricing, while
in the United States the control of adverse environmental
effects from mining must be justified for the foreseeable future
in terms of tangible social costs avoided.138
VIII. Conclusion
The administrative procedures of Great Britain and West
Germany in opening new coal mines have demonstrated a ca
pacity for a high level ofperformance in land use planning and
environmental control. Although American mining has failed
131 Interview with North Yorkshire County Council spokesman, at Selby, York
shire, April 17, 1975.
132 G. Dobry, Review of the Development Control System (Report to the Secre
taryofStatefor the Environment andthe Secretary ofStatefor Wales) 44 (1975). An
attempt will be made to determinecorresponding Germanadministration costsin the
University ofTennessee Environmental Center's research project.
Although the planning costs are approximately $80 million, development projects
worth $10 billion are processed annually. Also with more experience inthecomprehen
sive review procedures, the time for processing applications should be reduced. G.
Dobry, Review ofthe Development ControlSystem (Report totheSecretary ofState
for the Environment and the Secretary of State for Wales) 56 (1975).
133 Interview with a North Rhine-Westphalia landplanning official in Essen, West
Germany, April 23, 1975.
134 Interview with Charles Tebay, representative of the British Department of
Energy, in Knoxville, Tennessee, February, 1975.
135 See Randall and Pagoulatos, Surface Mining and Environmental Quality: An
Economic Perspective, 64 Ky. L.J. (in this symposium) (1976). Deep mines appear to
have smaller margins for environmental expenditures than do surface mines.
136 Notes 121-123, supra and accompanying text.
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to equal European performance in both of these areas, it is
unnecessary to make invidious comparisons or to castigate pri
vate and public participants in the coal mining process in
America. It is more relevant to realize that although some of
this European effectiveness is based upon basic differences be
tween America and the European nations, it is also a result of
the British and West German regulatory format. American
mining could profitably import some of these procedural ele
ments to avoidduplication and to ensure systematic regulatory
consideration of the array of issues presented by the current
expansion of coal mining. Environmental integrity and eco
nomic practicality would both be served by such comprehen
sive rationality in administrative proceedings.
